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Based on results given in the recent book by Meinhardt (2013), which presents a dual char-
acterization of the pre-kernel by a finite union of solution sets of a family of quadratic and
convex objective functions, we could derive some results related to the uniqueness of the
pre-kernel. Rather than extending the knowledge of game classes for which the pre-kernel
consists of a single point, we apply a different approach. We select a game from an arbitrary
game class with a single pre-kernel element satisfying the non-empty interior condition of
a payoff equivalence class, and then establish that the set of related and linear independent
games which are derived from this pre-kernel point of the default game replicates this point
also as its sole pre-kernel element. In the proof we apply results and techniques employed in
the above work. Namely, we prove in a first step that the linear mapping of a pre-kernel ele-
ment into a specific vector subspace of balanced excesses is a singleton. Secondly, that there
cannot exist a different and non-transversal vector subspace of balanced excesses in which a
linear transformation of a pre-kernel element can be mapped. Furthermore, we establish that
on the restricted subset on the game space that is constituted by the convex hull of the default
and the set of related games, the pre-kernel correspondence is single-valued, and therefore
continuous. Finally, we provide sufficient conditions that preserve the pre-nucleolus property
for related games even when the default game has not a single pre-kernel point.
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On the Single-Valuedness of the Pre-Kernel
1 INTRODUCTION
The coincidence of the kernel with the nucleolus – that is, the kernel consists of a single point – is only
known for some classes of transferable utility games. In particular, it was established by Maschler et al.
(1972) that for the class of convex games – introduced by Shapley (1971) – the kernel and the nucleolus
coincide. Recently, Geta´n et al. (2012) were able to extend this result to the class of zero-monotonic
almost-convex games. However, for the class of average-convex games, there is only some evidence that
both solution concepts coalesce.
In order to advance our understanding about TU games and game classes which possess an unique
pre-kernel element, we propose an alternative approach to investigate this issue while applying results and
techniques recently provided in the book by Meinhardt (2013). There, it was shown that the pre-kernel
of the grand coalition can be characterized by a finite union of solution sets of a family of quadratic and
convex functions (Theorem 7.3.1). This dual representation of the pre-kernel is based on a Fenchel-
Moreau generalized conjugation of the characteristic function. This generalized conjugation was in-
troduced by Martinez-Legaz (1996), which he called the indirect function. Immediately thereafter, it
was Meseguer-Artola (1997) who proved that the pre-kernel can be derived from an over-determined
system of non-linear equations. This over-determined system of non-linear equations is equivalent to a
minimization problem, whose set of global minima is equal to the pre-kernel set. However, an explicit
structural form of the objective function that would allow a better and more comprehensive understanding
of the pre-kernel set could not be performed.
The characterization of the pre-kernel set by a finite union of solution sets was possible due to a
partition of the domain of the objective function into a finite number of payoff sets. From each payoff
vector contained into a particular payoff set the same quadratic and convex function is induced. The
collection of all these functions on the domain composes the objective function from which a pre-kernel
element can be singled out. Moreover, each payoff set creates a linear mapping that maps payoff vectors
into a vector subspace of balanced excesses. Equivalent payoff sets which reflects the same underlying
bargaining situation produce the same vector subspace. The vector of balanced excesses generated by a
pre-kernel point is contained into the vector subspace spanned by the basis vectors derived from the payoff
set that contains this pre-kernel element. In contrast, the vectors of unbalanced excesses induced from the
minima of a quadratic function do not belong to their proper vector subspace. An orthogonal projection
maps these vectors on this vector subspace of the space of unbalanced excesses (cf. Meinhardt (2013,
Chap. 5-7)).
From this structure a replication result of a pre-kernel point can be attained. This is due that from
the payoff set that contains the selected pre-kernel element, and which satisfies in addition the non-empty
interior condition, a null space in the game space can be identified that allows a variation within the game
parameter without affecting the pre-kernel properties of this payoff vector. Even though the values of
the maximum surpluses have been varied, the set of most effective coalitions remains unaltered by the
parameter change. Hence, a set of related games can be determined, which are linear independent, and
possess the selected pre-kernel element of the default game as well as a pre-kernel point (cf. Meinhardt
(2013, Sect. 7.6)). In the sequel of this paper, we will establish that the set of related games, which are
derived from a default game exhibiting a singleton pre-kernel, must also possess the same unique pre-
kernel, and therefore coincides with the pre-nucleolus. Notice, that these games need not necessarily be
convex, average-convex, totally balanced, or zero-monotonic. They could belong to different subclasses
of games, however, they must satisfy the non-empty interior condition. Moreover, we show that the pre-
kernel correspondence in the game space restricted to the convex hull that is constituted by the extreme
points, which are specified by the default and related games, is single-valued, and therefore continuous.
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The structure of the paper is organized as follows: In the Section 2 we introduce some basic notations
and definitions to investigate the coincidence of the pre-kernel with the pre-nucleolus. Section 3 provides
the concept of the indirect function and gives a dual pre-kernel representation in terms of a solution set.
In the next step, the notion of lexicographically smallest most effective coalitions is introduced in order to
identify payoff equivalence classes on the domain of the objective function from which a pre-kernel ele-
ment can be determined. Moreover, relevant concepts from Meinhardt (2013) are reconsidered. Section 4
studies the uniqueness of the pre-kernel for related games. However, Section 5 investigates the continuity
of the pre-kernel correspondence. In Section 6 some sufficient conditions are worked out under which the
pre-nucleolus of a default game can preserve the pre-nucleolus property for related games. A few final
remarks close the paper.
2 SOME PRELIMINARIES
A cooperative game with transferable utility is a pair 〈N, v〉, where N is the non-empty finite player set
N := {1, 2, . . . , n}, and v is the characteristic function v : 2N → R with v(∅) := 0. A player i is an
element of N , and a coalition S is an element of the power set of 2N . The real number v(S) ∈ R is
called the value or worth of a coalition S ∈ 2N . Let S be a coalition, the number of members in S will be
denoted by s := |S|. We assume throughout that v(N) > 0 and n ≥ 2 is valid. In addition, we identify
a cooperative game by the vector v := (v(S))S⊆N ∈ Gn = R2n , if no confusion can arise. Finally, the
relevant game space for our investigation is defined by G(N) := {v ∈ Gn | v(∅) = 0 ∧ v(N) > 0}.
If x ∈ Rn, we apply x(S) :=∑k∈S xk for every S ∈ 2N with x(∅) := 0. The set of vectors x ∈ Rn
which satisfies the efficiency principle v(N) = x(N) is called the pre-imputation set and it is defined by
I 0(v) := {x ∈ Rn |x(N) = v(N)} , (2.1)
where an element x ∈ I 0(v) is called a pre-imputation.
Given a vector x ∈ I 0(v), we define the excess of coalition S with respect to the pre-imputation x in
the game 〈N, v〉 by
ev(S,x) := v(S)− x(S). (2.2)
Take a game v ∈ Gn. For any pair of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, the maximum surplus of player i over
player j with respect to any pre-imputation x ∈ I 0(v) is given by the maximum excess at x over the set
of coalitions containing player i but not player j, thus
sij(x, v) := max
S∈Gij
ev(S,x) where Gij := {S | i ∈ S and j /∈ S}. (2.3)
The set of all pre-imputations x ∈ I 0(v) that balances the maximum surpluses for each distinct pair of
players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j is called the pre-kernel of the game v, and is defined by
PrK(v) :=
{
x ∈ I 0(v) | sij(x, v) = sji(x, v) for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j
}
. (2.4)
In order to define the pre-nucleolus of a game v ∈ Gn, take any x ∈ Rn to define a 2n-tuple vector
θ(x) whose components are the excesses ev(S,x) of the 2n coalitions S ⊆ N , arranged in decreasing
order, that is,
θi(x) := e
v(Si,x) ≥ ev(Sj,x) =: θj(x) if 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ 2n. (2.5)
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Ordering the so-called complaint or dissatisfaction vectors θ(x) for all x ∈ Rn by the lexicographic order
≤L on Rn, we shall write
θ(x) <L θ(y) if ∃ an integer 1 ≤ k ≤ 2n, (2.6)
such that θi(x) = θi(y) for 1 ≤ i < k and θk(x) < θk(y). Furthermore, we write θ(x) ≤L θ(y) if
either θ(x) <L θ(y) or θ(x) = θ(y). Now the pre-nucleolus PrN(v) over the pre-imputations set I 0(v)
is defined by
PrN(v) =
{
x ∈ I 0(v) | θ(x) ≤L θ(y) ∀ y ∈ I 0(v)
}
. (2.7)
The pre-nucleolus of any game v ∈ Gn is non-empty as well as unique, and it is referred to as ν(v) if the
game context is clear from the contents or ν(N, v) otherwise.
3 A DUAL PRE-KERNEL REPRESENTATION
The concept of a Fenchel-Moreau generalized conjugation – also known as the indirect function of a char-
acteristic function game – was introduced by Martinez-Legaz (1996), and provides the same information
as the n-person cooperative game with transferable utility under consideration. This approach was suc-
cessfully applied in Meinhardt (2013) to give a dual representation of the pre-kernel solution of TU games
by means of solution sets of a family of quadratic objective functions. In this section, we review some
crucial results extensively studied in Meinhardt (2013, Chap. 5 & 6) as the building blocks to investigate
the single-valuedness of the pre-kernel correspondence.
The convex conjugate or Fenchel transform f∗ : Rn → R (where R := R ∪ {± ∞}) of a convex
function f : Rn → R (cf. Rockafellar (1970, Section 12)) is defined by
f∗(x ∗) = sup
x∈Rn
{〈 x ∗,x 〉 − f(x)} ∀x ∗ ∈ Rn.
Observe that the Fenchel transform f∗ is the point-wise supremum of affine functions p(x ∗) = 〈 x,x ∗ 〉−
µ such that (x, µ) ∈ (C × R) ⊆ (Rn × R), whereas C is a convex set. Thus, the Fenchel transform f∗ is
again a convex function.
We can generalize the definition of a Fenchel transform (cf. Martinez-Legaz (1996)) by introducing a
fixed non-empty subset K of Rn, then the conjugate of a function f : K → R is f c : Rn → R, given by
f c(x ∗) = sup
x∈K
{〈 x ∗,x 〉 − f(x)} ∀x ∗ ∈ Rn,
which is also known as the Fenchel-Moreau conjugation.
A vector x ∗ is said to be a subgradient of a convex function f at a point x, if
f(z) ≥ f(x) + 〈 x ∗, z− x 〉 ∀z ∈ Rn.
The set of all subgradients of f at x is called the subdifferentiable of f at x and it is defined by
∂f(x) := {x ∗ ∈ Rn | f(z) ≥ f(x) + 〈 x ∗, z− x 〉 (∀z ∈ Rn)}.
The set of all subgradients ∂f(x) is a closed convex set, which could be empty or may consist of just one
point. The multivalued mapping ∂f : x 7→ ∂f(x) is called the subdifferential of f .
Theorem 3.1 (Martinez-Legaz (1996)). The indirect function π : Rn → R of any n-person TU game is a
non-increasing polyhedral convex function such that
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(i) ∂π(x) ∩ {−1, 0}n 6= ∅ ∀x ∈ Rn,
(ii) {−1, 0}n ⊂ ⋃x∈Rn ∂π(x), and
(iii) minx∈Rn π(x) = 0.
Conversely, if π : Rn → R satisfies (i)-(iii) then there exists an unique n-person TU game 〈N, v〉 having
π as its indirect function, its characteristic function is given by
v(S) = min
x∈Rn
{
π(x) +
∑
k∈S
xk
}
∀ S ⊂ N. (3.1)
According to the above result, the associated indirect function π : Rn → R+ is given by:
π(x) = max
S⊆N
{
v(S)−
∑
k∈S
xk
}
,
for all x ∈ Rn. A characterization of the pre-kernel in terms of the indirect function is due to Meseguer-
Artola (1997). Here, we present this representation in its most general form, although we restrict ourselves
to the trivial coalition structure B = {N}.
The pre-imputation that comprises the possibility of compensation between a pair of players i, j ∈
N, i 6= j, is denoted as x i,j,δ = (x i,j,δk )k∈N ∈ I 0(v), with δ ≥ 0, which is given by
x
i,j,δ
N\{i,j} = xN\{ i,j}, x
i,j,δ
i = xi − δ and x i,j,δj = xj + δ.
Proposition 3.1 (Meseguer-Artola (1997); Meinhardt (2013)). For a TU game with indirect function π,
a pre-imputation x ∈ I 0(v) is in the pre-kernel of 〈N, v〉 for the coalition structure B = {B1, . . . , Bl},
x ∈ PrK(v,B), if, and only if, for every k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}, every i, j ∈ Bk, i < j, and some δ ≥ δ1(v,x),
one gets
π(x i,j,δ) = π(x j,i,δ).
whereas δ1(x, v) := maxk∈N,S⊂N\{k} |v(S ∪ {k}) − v(S)− xk|.
Meseguer-Artola (1997) was the first who recognized that based on the result of Proposition 3.1 a pre-
kernel element can be derived as a solution of an over-determined system of non-linear equations. For the
trivial coalition structure B = {N} the over-determined system of non-linear equations is given by

fij(x) = 0 ∀i, j ∈ N, i < j
f0(x) = 0
(3.2)
where, for some δ ≥ δ1(x, v),
fij(x) := π(x
i,j,δ)− π(x j,i,δ) ∀i, j ∈ N, i < j, (3.2-a)
and
f0(x) :=
∑
k∈N
xk − v(N). (3.2-b)
To any over-determined system an equivalent minimization problem is associated such that the set of global
minima coincides with the solution set of the system (cf. Meinhardt (2013, Sec. 5.3)). The solution set of
such a minimization problem is the set of values for x which minimizes the following function
h(x) :=
∑
i,j∈N
i<j
(fij(x))
2 + (f0(x))
2 ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ Rn. (3.3)
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As we will notice in the sequel, this optimization problem is equivalent to a least squares adjustment. For
further details see Meinhardt (2013, Chap. 6). From the existence of the pre-kernel and objective function
h of type (3.3), we get the following relation:
Corollary 3.1 (Meinhardt (2013)). For a TU game 〈N, v〉 with indirect function π, it holds that
h(x) =
∑
i,j∈N
i<j
(fij(x))
2 + (f0(x))
2 = min
y∈I0(v)
h(y) = 0, (3.4)
if, and only if, x ∈ PrK(v).
Proof. To establish the equivalence between the pre-kernel set and the set of global minima, we have to
notice that in view of Theorem 3.1 miny h = 0 is in force. Now, we prove necessity while taking a pre-
kernel element, i.e. x ∈ PrK(v), then the efficiency property is satisfied with f0(x) = 0 and the maximum
surpluses sij(x, v) must be balanced for each distinct pair of players i, j, implying that fij(x) = 0 for all
i, j ∈ N, i < j and therefore h(x) = 0. Thus, we are getting x ∈ M(h). To prove sufficiency, assume
that x ∈M(h), then h(x) = 0 with the implication that the efficiency property f0(x) = 0 and fij(x) = 0
must be valid for all i, j ∈ N, i < j. This means that the difference fij(x) = (π(xi,j,δ) − π(xj,i,δ))
is equalized for each distinct pair of indices i, j ∈ N, i < j. Thus, x ∈ PrK(v). It turns out that the
minimum set coincides with the pre-kernel, i.e., we have:
M(h) = {x ∈ I 0(v) | h(x) = 0} = PrK(v), (3.5)
with this argument we are done.
To understand the structural form of the objective function h, we will first identify equivalence relations
on its domain. To start with, we define the set of most effective or significant coalitions for each pair of
players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j at the payoff vector x by
Cij(x) := {S ∈ Gij | sij(x, v) = ev(S,x)}. (3.6)
When we gather for all pair of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j all these coalitions that support the claim of a
specific player over some other players, we have to consider the concept of the collection of most effective
or significant coalitions w.r.t. x, which we define as in Maschler et al. (1979, p. 315) by
C(x) :=
⋃
i,j∈N
i 6=j
Cij(x). (3.7)
Notice that the set Cij(x) for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j does not have cardinality one, which is required to
identify a partition on the domain of function h. Now let us choose for each pair i, j ∈ N, i 6= j a
descending ordering on the set of most effective coalitions in accordance with their size, and within such
a collection of most effective coalitions having smallest size the lexicographical minimum is singled out,
then we obtain the required uniqueness to partition the domain of h. This set is denoted by Sij(x) for all
pairs i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, and gathering all these collections we are able to specify the set of lexicographically
smallest most effective coalitions w.r.t. x through
S(x) := {Sij(x) | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}. (3.8)
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This set will be indicated in short as the set of lexicographically smallest coalitions or just more suc-
cinctly most effective coalitions whenever no confusion can arise. Notice that this set is never empty
and can uniquely be identified. This implies that the cardinality of this set is equal to n · (n − 1). In the
following we will observe that from these type of sets equivalence relations on the domain domh can be
identified.
To see this, consider the correspondence S on domh and two different vectors, say x and ~γ, then
both vectors are said to be equivalent w.r.t. the binary relation ∼ if, and only if, they induce the same
set of lexicographically smallest coalitions, that is, x ∼ ~γ if, and only if, S(x) = S(~γ). In case that the
binary relation ∼ is reflexive, symmetric and transitive, then it is an equivalence relation and it induces
equivalence classes [~γ] on domh which we define through [~γ] := {x ∈ dom h |x ∼ ~γ}. Thus, if x ∼ ~γ,
then [x] = [~γ], and if x ≁ ~γ, then [x] ∩ [~γ] = ∅. This implies that whenever the binary relation ∼ induces
equivalence classes [~γ] on domh, then it partitions the domain domh of the function h. The resulting
collection of equivalence classes [~γ] on domh is called the quotient of domh modulo ∼, and we denote
this collection by domh/ ∼. We indicate this set as an equivalence class whenever the context is clear,
otherwise we apply the term payoff set or payoff equivalence class.
Proposition 3.2 (Meinhardt (2013)). The binary relation ∼ on the set domh defined by x ∼ ~γ ⇐⇒
S(x) = S(~γ) is an equivalence relation, which forms a partition of the set domh by the collection of
equivalence classes {[~γk]}k∈J , where J is an arbitrary index set. Furthermore, for all k ∈ J , the induced
equivalence class [~γk] is a convex set .
Proof. For a proof see Meinhardt (2013, p. 59).
The cardinality of the collection of the payoff equivalence classes induced by a TU game is finite
(cf. Meinhardt (2013, Proposition 5.4.2.)). Furthermore, on each payoff equivalence class [~γ] from the
domh an unique quadratic and convex function can be identified. Therefore, there must be a finite com-
posite of these functions that constitutes the objective function h. In order to construct such a quadratic and
convex function suppose that ~γ ∈ [~γ]. From this vector we attain the collection of most effective coalitions
S(~γ) in accordance with Proposition 3.2. Then observe that the differences in the values between a pair
{i, j} of players are defined by αij := (v(Sij)− v(Sji)) ∈ R for all i, j ∈ N, i < j, and α0 := v(N) > 0
w.r.t. S(~γ). All of these q-components compose the q-coordinates of a payoff independent vector ~α, with
q =
(
n
2
)
+ 1. A vector that reflects the degree of unbalancedness of excesses for all pair of players, is
denoted by ~ξ ∈ Rq, that is a q-column vector, which is given by
ξij := e
v(Sij , ~γ)− ev(Sji, ~γ) = v(Sij)− γ(Sij)− v(Sji) + γ(Sji) ∀ i, j ∈ N, i < j,
= v(Sij)− v(Sji) + γ(Sji)− γ(Sij) = αij + γ(Sji)− γ(Sij) ∀ i, j ∈ N, i < j,
ξ0 := v(N)− γ(N) = α0 − γ(N).
(3.9)
In view of Proposition 3.2, all vectors contained in the equivalence class [~γ] induce the same set S(~γ), and
it holds
ξij := e
v(Sij, ~γ)− ev(Sji, ~γ) = sij(~γ, v)− sji(~γ, v) =: ζij ∀ i, j ∈ N, i < j. (3.10)
The payoff dependent configurations ~ξ and ~ζ having the following interrelationship outside its equivalence
class: ~ξ 6= ~ζ for all y ∈ [~γ]c. Moreover, equation (3.10) does not necessarily mean that for ~γ ′, ~γ∗ ∈
[~γ], ~γ ′ 6= ~γ∗, it holds ~ξ ′ = ~ξ∗. Hence, the vector of (un)balanced excesses ~ξ is only equal with the vector
of (un)balanced maximum surpluses ~ζ if the corresponding pre-imputation ~γ is drawn from its proper
equivalence class [~γ].
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In addition, we write for sake of simplicity that Eij := (1Sji − 1Sij ) ∈ Rn, ∀i, j ∈ N, i < j, and
E0 := −1N ∈ Rn. Combining these q-column vectors, we can construct an (n × q)-matrix in Rn×q
referred to as E, and which is given by
E := [E1,2, . . . ,En−1,n,E0] ∈ Rn×q . (3.11)
Proposition 3.3 (Quadratic Function). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU game with indirect function π, then an arbitrary
vector ~γ in the domain of h, i.e. ~γ ∈ domh, induces a quadratic function:
hγ(x) = (1/2) · 〈 x,Qx 〉+ 〈 x,a 〉+ α x ∈ domh, (3.12)
where a is a column vector of coefficients, α is a scalar and Q is a symmetric (n× n)-matrix with integer
coefficients taken from the interval [−n · (n− 1), n · (n− 1)].
Proof. The proof is given in Meinhardt (2013, pp. 66-68).
By the above discussion, the objective function h and the quadratic as well as convex function hγ
of type (3.12) coincide on the payoff set [~γ] (cf. Meinhardt (2013, Lemma 6.2.2)). However, on the
complement [~γ]c it holds h 6= hγ . Moreover, in view of Meinhardt (2013, Proposition 6.2.2) function h is
composed of a finite family of quadratic and convex functions of type (3.12).
Proposition 3.4 (Least Squares). A quadratic function hγ given by equation (3.12) is equivalent to
〈 ~α +E⊤ x, ~α +E⊤ x 〉 = ‖ ~α +E⊤ x ‖2. (3.13)
Therefore, the matrix Q ∈ Rn2 can also be expressed as Q = 2 · E E⊤, and the column vector a as
2 ·E ~α ∈ Rn. Finally, the scalar α is given by ‖~α‖2, where E ∈ Rn×q,E⊤ ∈ Rq×n and ~α ∈ Rq.
Proof. The proof can be found in Meinhardt (2013, pp. 70-71).
Realize that the transpose of a vector or a matrix is denoted by the symbols x⊤, and Q⊤ respectively.
Lemma 3.1 (Meinhardt (2013)). Let x, ~γ ∈ domh,x = ~γ + z and let ~γ induces the matrices E ∈
R
n×q,E⊤ ∈ Rq×n determined by formula (3.11), and ~α, ~ξ ∈ Rq as in equation (3.9). If x ∈M(hγ), then
1. −E⊤ x = P ~α.
2. E⊤ ~γ = P (~ξ − ~α) = (~ξ − ~α).
3. −E⊤ z = P ~ξ.
In addition, let q :=
(n
2
)
+1. The matrix P ∈ Rq2 is either equal to 2 ·E⊤Q−1E, if the matrix Q ∈ Rn2 is
non-singular, or it is equal to 2 ·E⊤Q†E, if the matrix Q is singular. Furthermore, it holds for the matrix
P that P 6= Iq and rankP ≤ n.
Proof. The proof is given in Meinhardt (2013, pp. 80-81).
Notice that Q† is the Moore-Penrose or pseudo-inverse matrix of matrix Q, if matrix Q is singular.
This matrix is unique according to the following properties: (1) general condition, i.e. QQ†Q = Q, (2)
reflexive, i.e. Q†QQ† = Q†, (3) normalized, i.e. (QQ†)⊤ = Q†Q, and finally (4) reversed normalized,
i.e. (Q†Q)⊤ = QQ†.
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Proposition 3.5 (Orthogonal Projection Operator). Matrix P is idempotent and self-adjoint, i.e. P is an
orthogonal projection operator.
Proof. The proof can be found in Meinhardt (2013, p. 86).
Lemma 3.2 (Meinhardt (2013).). Let E be a subspace of Rq with basis {e1, . . . , em} derived from the lin-
ear independent vectors of matrix E⊤ having rank m, with m ≤ n, and let {w1, . . . ,wq−m} be a basis of
W := E⊥. In addition, define matrix E⊤ := [e1, . . . , em] ∈ Rq×m, and matrix W⊤ := [w1, . . . ,wq−m] ∈
R
q×(q−m)
, then for any ~β ∈ Rq it holds
1. ~β = [E⊤ W⊤] · c where c ∈ Rq is a coefficient vector, and
2. the matrix [E⊤ W⊤] ∈ Rq×q is invertible, that is, we have
[E⊤ W⊤]−1 =
[
(E E⊤)−1E
(W W⊤)−1W
]
.
Proof. For a proof see Meinhardt (2013, pp. 90-91).
Notice that E can be interpreted as indicating a vector subspace of balanced excesses. A pre-imputation
will be mapped into its proper vector subspace of balanced excesses E, i.e. the vector subspace induced
by the pre-imputation. However, the corresponding vector of (un)balanced excesses generated by this
pre-imputation is an element of this vector subspace of balanced excesses, if the pre-imputation is also a
pre-kernel point. Hence, the vector of balanced excesses coincides with the vector of balanced maximum
surpluses. This is a consequence of Lemma 3.1 or see Proposition 8.4.1 in Meinhardt (2013). Otherwise,
this vector of unbalanced excesses will be mapped by the orthogonal projection P on E. More information
about the properties of this kind of vector subspace can be found in Meinhardt (2013, pp. 87-113 and 138-
168).
Proposition 3.6 (Positive General Linear Group). Let {e1, . . . , em} as well as {e11, . . . , e1m} be two or-
dered bases of the subspace E derived from the payoff sets [~γ] and [~γ1], respectively. In addition, define the
associated basis matrices E⊤, E⊤1 ∈ Rq×m as in Lemma 3.2, then the unique transition matrix X ∈ Rm
2
such that E⊤1 = E⊤X is given, is an element of the positive general linear group, that is X ∈ GL+(m).
Proof. The proof can be found in Meinhardt (2013, p. 101).
Proposition 3.6 denotes two payoff sets [~γ] and [~γ1] as equivalent, if there exists a transition matrix X
from the positive general linear group, that is X ∈ GL+(m), such that E⊤1 = E⊤X is in force. Notice
that the transition matrix X must be unique (cf. Meinhardt (2013, p. 102)). The underlying group action
(cf. Meinhardt (2013, Corollary 6.6.1)) can be interpreted that a bargaining situation is transformed into
an equivalent bargaining situation. For a thorough discussion of a group action onto the set of all ordered
bases, the interested reader should consult Meinhardt (2013, Sect. 6.6).
The vector space Rq is an orthogonal decomposition by the subspaces E and NE. We denote in the
sequel a basis of the orthogonal complement of space E by {w1, . . . ,wq−m}. This subspace of Rq is
identified by W := NE = E⊥. In addition, we have Pwk = 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , q −m}. Thus, we can
obtain the following corollary
Corollary 3.2 (Meinhardt (2013)). If ~γ induces the matrices E ∈ Rn×q,E⊤ ∈ Rq×n determined by
formula (3.11), then with respect to the Euclidean inner product, getting
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1. Rq = E⊕W = E⊕ E⊥.
A consequence of the orthogonal projection method presented by the next theorem and corollary is
that every payoff vector belonging to the intersection of the minimum set of function hγ and its payoff
equivalence class [~γ] is a pre-kernel element. This due to hγ = h on [~γ].
Theorem 3.2 (Orthogonal Projection Method). Let ~γk ∈ [~γ] for k = 1, 2, 3. If ~γ2 ∈ M(hγ) and ~γk /∈
M(hγ) for k = 1, 3, then ~ζ2 = ~ξ2 = 0, and consequently ~γ2 ∈ PrK(v).
Proof. For a proof see Meinhardt (2013, pp. 109-111).
Corollary 3.3 (Meinhardt (2013)). Let be [~γ] an equivalence class of dimension 3 ≤ m ≤ n, and x ∈
M(hγ) ∩ [~γ], then ~α = P ~α, and consequently x ∈ PrK(v).
4 THE UNIQUENESS OF THE PRE-KERNEL
To study the uniqueness of the pre-kernel solution of a related TU game derived from a pre-kernel element
of a default game, we need to know: (1) if the linear mapping of a pre-kernel element into a specific
vector subspace of balanced excesses E consists of a single point, and (2) that there can not exist any other
non-transversal vector subspace of balanced excesses E1 in which a linear transformation of pre-kernel
element can be mapped. (3) It must be shown that the pre-kernel coincides with the pre-nucleolus of the
set of related games, otherwise, it is obvious that there must exist at least a second pre-kernel point, namely
the pre-nucleolus.
For conducting this line of investigation some additional concepts are needed. In a first step we in-
troduce the definition of a unanimity game, which is indicated as: uT (S) := 1, if T ⊆ S, otherwise
uT (S) := 0, whereas T ⊆ N,T 6= ∅. The collection of all unanimity games forms a unanimity/game
basis. A formula to express the coordinates of this basis is given by
v =
∑
T⊂N,
T 6=∅
λvT uT ⇐⇒ λvT =
∑
S⊂T,
S 6=∅
(−1)t−s · v(S),
if 〈N, v〉, where |S| = s, and |T | = t. A coordinate λvT is said to be an unanimity coordinate of game
〈N, v〉, and vector λv is called the unanimity coordinates of game 〈N, v〉. Notice that we assume here that
the game is defined in R2n−1 rather than R2n , since we want to write for sake of convenience the game
basis in matrix form without a column and row of zeros. Thus we write
v =
∑
T⊂N,
T 6=∅
λvT uT = [u{1}, . . . ,u{N}]λ
v = U λv
where the unanimity basis U is in Rp′×p′ with p′ = 2n − 1. In addition, define the unity games (Dirac
games) 1T for all T ⊆ N as: 1T (S) := 1, if T = S, otherwise 1T (S) := 0.
In the next step, we select a payoff vector ~γ, which also determines its payoff set [~γ]. With regard to
Proposition 3.2, this vector induces in addition a set of lexicographically smallest most effective coalitions
indicated by S(~γ). Implying that we get the configuration ~α by the q-coordinates αij := (v(Sij) −
v(Sji)) ∈ R for all i, j ∈ N, i < j, and α0 := v(N). Furthermore, we can also define a set of vectors as
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the differences of unity games w.r.t. the set of lexicographically smallest most effective coalitions, which
is given by
vij := 1
Sij − 1Sji for Sij , Sji ∈ S(~γ) and v0 := 1N , (4.1)
whereas vij ,v0 ∈ Rp′ for all i, j ∈ N, i < j. With these column vectors, we can identify matrix
V := [v1,2, . . . ,vn−1,n,v0] ∈ Rp′×q. Then we obtain ~α = V⊤ v with v ∈ Rp′ due to the removed empty
set. Moreover, by the measure y(S) :=
∑
k∈S yk for all ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , we extend every payoff vector y
to a vector y ∈ Rp′ , and define the excess vector at y by ey := v − y ∈ Rp′, then we get ~ξy = V⊤ ey.
From matrix V⊤, we can also derive an orthogonal projection PV specified by V⊤ (V⊤)† ∈ Rq×q such
that Rq = V ⊕ V⊥ is valid, i.e. the rows of matrix V⊤ are a spanning system of the vector subspace
V ⊆ Rq×q, thus V := span{v⊤1,2, . . . ,v⊤n−1,n,v⊤0 }. Vector subspace V reflects the power of the set of
lexicographically smallest most effective coalitions. In contrast, vector subspace E reflects the ascribed
unbalancedness in the coalition power w.r.t. the bilateral bargaining situation attained at ~γ through S(~γ).
The next results show how these vector subspaces are intertwined.
Lemma 4.1 (Meinhardt (2013)). Let E⊤ ∈ Rq×n be defined as in Equation (3.11), V⊤ ∈ Rq×p′ as by
Equation (4.1), then there exists a matrix Z⊤ ∈ Rp′×n such that E⊤ = V⊤Z⊤ if, and only if, RE⊤ ⊆ RV⊤ ,
that is, E ⊆ V.
Proof. The proof is given in Meinhardt (2013, p. 141).
Notice that the minimal rank of matrix V⊤ is bounded by E⊤ which is equal to m < n with the
consequence that we get in this case V = E. However, the maximal rank is equal to q, and then V = Rq
(cf. Meinhardt (2013, Corollary 7.4.1)).
Lemma 4.2 (Meinhardt (2013)). Let ~α, ~ξ ∈ Rq as in Equation (3.9), then the following relations are
satisfied on the vector space V:
1. PV ~α = ~α ∈ V
2. PV ~ξ = ~ξ ∈ V
3. PV (~ξ − ~α) = (~ξ − ~α) ∈ V
4. PV E⊤ = PE⊤ = E⊤, hence E ⊆ V
5. EPV = EP = E, hence RE ⊆ V.
Proof. For a proof see Meinhardt (2013, p. 142).
It was worked out by Meinhardt (2013, Sect. 7.6) that a pre-kernel element of a specific game can
be replicated as a pre-kernel element of a related game whenever the non-empty interior property of the
payoff set, in which the pre-kernel element of default game is located, is satisfied. In this case, a full
dimensional ellipsoid can be inscribed from which some bounds can be specified within the game pa-
rameter can be varied without destroying the pre-kernel properties of the payoff vector of the default
game. These bounds specify a redistribution of the bargaining power among coalitions while supporting
the selected pre-imputation still as a pre-kernel point. Although the values of the maximum excesses have
been changed by the parameter variation, the set of lexicographically smallest most significant coalitions
remains unaffected.
Lemma 4.3 (Meinhardt (2013)). If x ∈M(hvγ), then x ∈M(hvµγ ) for all µ ∈ R, where vµ := U(λv+µ∆)
and 0 6= ∆ ∈ NW = {∆ ∈ Rp ′ |W∆ = 0}, where W := V⊤U ∈ Rq×p ′.
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Proof. Let x be a minimizer of function hvγ under game v, then x remains a minimizer for a function hvµγ
induced by game vµ whenever Qx = −2E ~α = −a remains valid. Since the payoff vector has induced
the matrices Q,E and matrix V defined by [v1,2, . . . ,vn−1,n,v0], where the vectors are defined as by
formula (4.1). We simply have to prove that the configuration ~α remains invariant against an appropriate
change in the game parameter. Observing that matrix W has a rank equal to or smaller than q =
(n
2
)
+ 1,
say m ≤ q, then the null space of matrix W has rank of p′ −m, thus NW 6= {∅}. But then exists some
0 6= ∆ ∈ Rp′ s.t. ∆ ∈ NW and vµ = U(λv + µ∆) for µ ∈ R\{0}, getting
W λv
µ
= W (λv + µ∆) = V⊤ (v + µv∆) = V⊤ v = ~α,
whereas W∆ = V⊤ v∆ = 0 with v∆ := U∆. This argument proves that the configuration ~α remains
invariant against a change in the game parameter space by v∆ 6= 0. This implies that the payoff vector x
is also a minimizer for function hvµγ under game vµ.
Lemma 4.4 (Meinhardt (2013)). If [~γ] has non-empty interior and x ∈ PrK(v) ⊂ [~γ], then there exists
some critical bounds given by
δεij(x) =
±√c¯
‖E⊤(1j − 1i)‖ 6= 0 ∀i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, (4.2)
with c¯ > 0 and ‖E⊤(1j − 1i)‖ > 0.
Proof. Define a set ε := {y |hvγ(y) ≤ c¯} ⊂ [~γ], whereas hvγ(y) = (1/2) · 〈 y,Qy 〉 + 〈 y,a 〉 + α.
By assumption the payoff set [~γ] has non-empty interior, we can say that ε is the ellipsoid of maximum
volume obtained by equation (3.12) that lies inside of the convex payoff set [~γ]. This ellipsoid must have a
strictly positive volume, since the payoff equivalence class [~γ] has non-empty interior, hence we conclude
that c¯ > 0. Of course, the set ε is a convex subset of the convex set [~γ], therefore hv = hvγ on ε. Moreover,
the solution set M(hvγ) is a subset of the ellipsoid ε, which is the smallest non-empty ellipsoid of the
form (3.12), i.e., it is its center in view of Theorem 3.2. By our supposition PrK(v) ⊂ [~γ], we conclude
that M(hv) = M(hvγ) = PrK(v) must be satisfied. In the next step similar to Maschler et al. (1979), we
define some critical numbers δεij(x) ∈ R s.t.
δεij(x) := max {δ ∈ R |x i,j,δ = x− δ 1i + δ 1j ∈ ε} ∀ i, j ∈ N, i 6= j. (4.3)
That is, the number δεij(x) is the maximum amount that can be transferred from i to j while remaining in
the ellipsoid ε. This number is well defined for convex sets having non-empty interior.
In addition, observe that x i,j,δε = x−δεij(x)1i+δεij(x)1j is an unique boundary point of the ellipsoid
ε of type (3.12) with maximum volume. Having specified by the point x i,j,δε a boundary point, getting
hv(x i,j,δ
ε
) = hvγ(x
i,j,δε) = c¯ > 0⇐⇒
‖E⊤ x i,j,δε + ~α‖2 = c¯⇐⇒ ‖E⊤ x+ ~α+ δεij(x)E⊤(1j − 1i)‖2 = c¯⇐⇒
‖E⊤ x+ ~α‖2 + 2 · δεij(x) 〈E⊤ x+ ~α,E⊤(1j − 1i) 〉+ (δεij(x))2 ‖E⊤(1j − 1i)‖2 = c¯⇐⇒
(δεij(x))
2 ‖E⊤(1j − 1i)‖2 = c¯ ∀ i, j ∈ N, i 6= j.
The last conclusion follows, since by assumption we have x ∈ PrK(v), which is equivalent to hv(x) =
hvγ(x) = 0, and therefore we obtain E⊤ x + ~α = 0. In addition, the volume of the ellipsoid ε is strictly
positive such that c¯ > 0, this result implies that (δεij(x))2 as well as ‖E⊤(1j − 1i)‖2 must also be strictly
positive. Therefore, we get finally (4.2).
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Theorem 4.1 (Meinhardt (2013)). If [~γ] has non-empty interior and x ∈ PrK(v) ⊂ [~γ], then x ∈ PrK(vµ)
for all µ · v∆ ∈ [−C,C]p′ , where vµ = v + µ · v∆ ∈ Rp′, µ ∈ R
C := min
i,j∈N,i 6=j
{ ±
√
c¯
‖E⊤(1j − 1i)‖

}
, (4.4)
and 0 6= ∆ ∈ NW = {∆ ∈ Rp ′ |W∆ = 0} with matrix W := V⊤U.
Proof. By Lemma 4.4 x i,j,δε ∈ ε ⊂ [~γ], is an unique boundary point of the ellipsoid ε of type (3.12)
with maximum volume. We conclude that either (1) sij(x i,j,δε) = sij(x) + δεij(x) if S ∈ Gij , or (2)
sji(x
i,j,δε) = sji(x) − δεij(x) if S ∈ Gji, or otherwise (3) sij(x i,j,δ
ε
) = sij(x) is satisfied. Moreover,
let v, vµ, v∆ ∈ Rp′ and recall that vµ = U(λv + µ∆) with 0 6= ∆ ∈ NW. Then it holds vµ(S) =
v(S) + µ · v∆(S) for all S ∈ 2n\{∅}. In the next step, extend the pre-kernel element x to a vector x by
the measure x(S) :=
∑
k∈S xk for all S ∈ 2n\{∅}, then define the excess vector by e := v − x. Due to
these definitions, we obtain for ~ξ vµ at x:
~ξ v
µ
= V⊤ eµ = V⊤ (vµ − x) = V⊤ (v − x+ µ · v∆) = V⊤ (v − x) = V⊤ e = ~ξ = 0.
By Lemma 4.3, the system of excesses remains balanced for all µ ∈ R. However, the system of maximum
surpluses remains invariant on a hypercube specified by the critical values of the ellipsoid ε. Thus, for
appropriate values of µ the expression µ·v∆(S) belongs to the non-empty interval [−C,C] for S ∈ 2n\{∅}.
This interval specifies the range in which the game parameter can vary without having any impact on the
set of most effective coalition given by S(x). Thus, the coalitions S(x) still have maximum surpluses for
games defined by vµ = U(λv + µ∆) for all µU∆ = µ · v∆ ∈ [−C,C]p′ . Hence the pre-kernel solution x
is invariant against a change in the hypercube [−C,C]p′ . The conclusion follows.
Meinhardt (2013, Sec. 7.6) has shown by some examples that the specified bounds by Theorem 4.1
are not tight, in the sense that pre-kernel points belonging to the relative interior of a payoff set can also
be the object of a replication. However, pre-kernel elements which are located on the relative boundary
of a payoff set are probably not replicable. Therefore, there must exist a more general rule to reproduce a
pre-kernel element for a related game vµ.
In the course of our discussion, we establish that the single pre-kernel element of a default game which
is an interior point of a payoff set is also the singleton pre-kernel of the derived related games. In a
first step, we show that there exists an unique linear transformation of the pre-kernel point of a related
game into the vector subspace of balanced excesses E. This means, there is no other pre-kernel element
in a payoff equivalence class that belongs to the same set of ordered bases, i.e. reflecting an equivalent
bargaining situation with a division of the proceeds of mutual cooperation in accordance with the pre-
kernel solution. Secondly, we prove that there can not exist any other vector subspace of balanced excesses
E1 non-transversal to E in which a pre-kernel vector can be mapped by a linear transformation. That is,
there exists no other non-equivalent payoff set in which an other pre-kernel point can be located.
Lemma 4.5 (Meinhardt (2013)). Let ~γ induces matrix E, then
(E⊤)† = 2 ·Q†E ∈ Rn×q.
Proof. Remind from Lemma 3.1 that P = 2 ·E⊤Q†E holds. In addition, note that we have the following
relation Q†Q = (E⊤)†E⊤ which is an orthogonal projection onto RE. Then attaining
2 ·Q†E = 2 ·Q†QQ†E = 2 · (E⊤)†E⊤Q†E
= (E⊤)†(2 · E⊤Q†E) = (E⊤)†P = (E⊤)†.
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The last equality follows from Lemma 4.2. This argument terminates the proof.
Notice that in the sequel SO(n) denotes the special orthogonal group, whereas GL+(n) denotes the
positive general linear group (cf. Meinhardt (2013, pp. 99-109)).
Proposition 4.1. Let E⊤1 = E⊤X with X ∈ SO(n), that is [~γ] ∼ [~γ1]. In addition, assume that the payoff
equivalence class [~γ] induced from TU game 〈N, v 〉 has non-empty interior such that {x} = PrK(v) ⊂
[~γ] is satisfied, then there exists no other pre-kernel element in payoff equivalence class [~γ1] for a related
TU game 〈N, vµ 〉, where vµ = v + µ · v∆ ∈ Rp′ , as defined by Lemma 4.3.
Proof. By the way of contradiction suppose that x,y ∈ PrK(vµ) with y ∈ [~γ1] is valid. Then we get
hv
µ
(x) = hv
µ
γ (x) = ‖E⊤ x+ ~α‖2 = 0 and hv
µ
(y) = hv
µ
γ1 (y) = ‖E⊤1 y+ ~α1‖2 = 0,
implying that
P ~α = ~α ∈ E and P ~α1 = ~α1 ∈ E. (4.5)
Moreover, we have E⊤1 = E⊤X with X ∈ SO(n), then E ⊆ V ∩ V1 in accordance with Lemma 7.4.1
by Meinhardt (2013). Now assume that ~α1 = V⊤1 vµ holds with V1 ⊆ V. The latter supposition implies
V
⊤
1 = PV V
⊤
1 , since for every ~β ∈ V we get ~β = PV ~β (cf. Remark 6.5.1 Meinhardt (2013)). According
to V1 ⊆ V it also holds NW1 ⊇ NW. Our hypothesis y ∈ PrK(vµ) implies
0 = E⊤1 y+ ~α1 = V
⊤
1 Z
⊤ y+V⊤1 v
µ = V⊤1 Z
⊤ y+V⊤1 (v + µ · v∆) = V⊤1 (v − y),
whereas the vector of measures y is expressed by y = −Z⊤ y (cf. Meinhardt (2013, p. 141)). The result
V
⊤
1 (v − y) = 0 yields to y ∈ PrK(v), which is a contradiction. Therefore, we conclude that V ⊂ V1
must be satisfied.
In addition, from ~α1 = V⊤1 vµ we attain PV ~α1 = V⊤ (V⊤)†V⊤1 vµ 6= V⊤1 vµ = ~α1 in accordance
with PV V⊤1 6= V⊤1 , in fact, it holds V ⊂ V1. Thus, we have PV ~α1 /∈ V contradicting that PV ~α1 = ~α1 ∈
E ⊆ V ⊂ V1 holds true. From this, we conclude that ~α1 = V⊤ vµ must be in force.
Furthermore, from (4.5) we have
P ~α− ~α = P ~α1 − ~α1 = 0 ∈ E⇐⇒ P (~α− ~α1) = (~α− ~α1) ∈ E.
Therefore, obtaining the equivalent expression
E⊤ (X y − x) = (~α− ~α1) = V⊤ v −V⊤ (v + µ · v∆) = 0,
then x = X y, since matrix E⊤ has full rank due to {x} = PrK(v). Furthermore, notice that
〈x,y 〉 = 〈 (E⊤)† ~α, (E⊤1 )† ~α1 〉 = 〈 (E⊤)† ~α,X−1 (E⊤)† ~α 〉 = 〈 2Q† E ~α, 2X−1Q†E ~α 〉 6= 0
Matrix E⊤ has full rank, and Q is symmetric and positive definite, hence Q† = Q−1, and the above
expression can equivalently be written as
〈Q† a,X−1Q† a 〉 = 〈Q−1 a,X−1Q−1 a 〉 = 〈a,QX−1Q−1 a 〉
= 〈a,X1a 〉 = 〈a,a1 〉 6= 0,
(4.6)
while using a = 2E ~α from Proposition 3.4, and with similar matrix X1 = QX−1Q−1 as well as
a1 = X1 a. According to E⊤1 = E⊤X with X ∈ SO(n), we can write X = Q−1(2EE⊤1 ). But then
X1 = QX
−1Q−1 = Q (2EE⊤1 )
−1.
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Since we have X ∈ SO(n), it holds X−1 = X⊤ implying that
X⊤1 = X
−1 = (2EE⊤1 )
−1Q = (2EE⊤1 )Q
−1 = X⊤ = X−11 ,
which induces X = Q−1 (2EE⊤1 ) = Q (2EE⊤1 )−1 = X1. Now, observe
X1 = QX
−1Q−1 = QX⊤Q−1 = Q (2EE⊤1 )Q
−1Q−1
= Q (2EE⊤X)Q−2 = Q2XQ−2,
hence, we can conclude that X = I implying X1 = I as well. We infer that x = y contradicting the
assumption x 6= y due to x ∈ [~γ], and y ∈ [~γ1]. With this argument we are done.
Proposition 4.2. Impose the same conditions as under Proposition 4.1 with the exception that X ∈
GL+(n), then there exists no other pre-kernel element in payoff equivalence class [~γ1] for a related TU
game 〈N, vµ 〉.
Proof. By the proof of Proposition 4.1 the system of linear equations E⊤ (X y − x) = 0 is consistent,
then we get x = X y by the full rank of matrix E⊤. By Equation 4.6 we obtain similar matrix X1 =
QX−1Q−1, hence the matrix X1 is in the same orbit (conjugacy class) as matrix X−1, this implies that
E⊤ = E⊤1 X
−1 = E⊤1 X1 must be in force. But then E⊤ = E⊤XX1, which requires that X X1 = I
must be satisfied in view of the uniqueness of the transition matrix X ∈ GL+(m) (cf. Meinhardt (2013,
p. 102)). In addition, we have a1 = X1 a as well as a1 = 2E1 ~α = X a. Therefore, we obtain
X a1 = a = X
2 a. From this we draw the conclusion in connection with the uniqueness of the transition
matrix X that X = I is valid. Hence, x = y as required.
Proposition 4.3. Assume [~γ] ≁ [~γ1], and that the payoff equivalence class [~γ] induced from TU game
〈N, v 〉 has non-empty interior such that {x} = PrK(v) ⊂ [~γ] is satisfied, then there exists no other pre-
kernel element in payoff equivalence class [~γ1] for a related TU game 〈N, vµ 〉, where vµ = v + µ · v∆ ∈
R
p′
, as defined by Lemma 4.3.
Proof. We have to establish that there is no other element y ∈ PrK(vµ) such that y ∈ [~γ1] is valid,
whereas y /∈ PrK(v) in accordance with the uniqueness of the pre-kernel for game v. In view of Theo-
rem 4.1 the pre-kernel {x} = PrK(v) of game 〈N, v 〉 is also a pre-kernel element of the related game
〈N, vµ 〉, i.e. x ∈ PrK(vµ) with x ∈ [~γ] due to Corollary 3.2.
Extend the payoff element y to a vector y by the measure y(S) :=
∑
k∈S yk for all S ∈ 2n\{∅}, then
define the excess vector by eµ := vµ−y. Moreover, compute the vector of (un)balanced excesses ~ξ vµ at y
for game vµ by V⊤1 eµ. This vector is also the vector of (un)balanced maximum surpluses, since y ∈ [~γ1],
and therefore h vµ = h vµγ1 on [~γ1] in view of Lemma 6.2.2 by Meinhardt (2013). Notice that in order to
have a pre-kernel element at y for the related game vµ it must hold ~ξ vµ = 0. In addition, by hypothesis
[~γ] ≁ [~γ1], it must hold E⊤ = V⊤Z⊤ and E⊤1 = V⊤1 Z⊤ in view of Lemma 4.1, thus E⊤1 6= E⊤X for
all X ∈ GL+(n). This implies that we derive the corresponding matrices W := V⊤U and W1 := V⊤1 U,
respectively.
We have to consider two cases, namely ∆ ∈ NW ∩NW1 and ∆ ∈ NW\NW1 .
1. Suppose ∆ ∈ NW ∩NW1 , then we get
~ξ v
µ
= V⊤1 e
µ = V⊤1 (v
µ − y) = V⊤1 (v − y + µ · v∆) = V⊤1 (v − y) = V⊤1 e = ~ξ v 6= 0.
Observe that ~ξ v = V⊤1 (v − y) 6= 0, since vector y ∈ [~γ1] is not a pre-kernel element of game v.
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2. Now suppose ∆ ∈ NW\NW1 , then
~ξ v
µ
= V⊤1 e
µ = V⊤1 (v
µ− y) = V⊤1 (v−y+µ · v∆) = V⊤1 e+µ ·V⊤1 v∆ = ~ξ v +µ ·V⊤1 v∆ 6= 0.
Since, we have V⊤1 (v − y) 6= 0 as well as V⊤1 v∆ 6= 0, and V⊤1 v∆ can not be expressed by
−V⊤1 (v−y) in accordance with our hypothesis. To see this, suppose that the vector ∆ is expressible
in this way, then it must hold ∆ = − 1µ (W1)† ~ξ v. However, this implies
W∆ = − 1
µ
W (W1)
† ~ξ v = − 1
µ
(V⊤U) (V⊤1 U)
† ~ξ v = − 1
µ
V
⊤ (V⊤1 )
† ~ξ v 6= 0.
This argument terminates the proof.
To complete our uniqueness investigation, we need to establish that the single pre-kernel element of
the default game also preserves the pre-nucleolus property for the related games, otherwise we can be sure
that there must exist at least a second pre-kernel point for the related game different form the first one. For
doing so, we introduce the following set:
Definition 4.1. For every x ∈ Rn, and ψ ∈ R define the set
Dv(ψ,x) := {S ⊆ N | ev(S,x) ≥ ψ} , (4.7)
and let B = {S1, . . . , Sm} be a collection of non-empty sets of N . We denote the collection B as bal-
anced whenever there exist positive numbers wS for all S ∈ B such that we have
∑
S∈B wS1S = 1N .
The numbers wS are called weights for the balanced collection B and 1S is the indicator function or
characteristic vector 1S : N 7→ {0, 1} given by 1S(k) := 1 if k ∈ S, otherwise 1S(k) := 0.
A characterization of the pre-nucleolus in terms of balanced collections is due to Kohlberg (1971).
Theorem 4.2. Let 〈N, v 〉 be a TU game and let be x ∈ I 0(v). Then x = ν(N, v) if, and only if, for every
ψ ∈ R,Dv(ψ,x) 6= ∅ implies that Dv(ψ,x) is a balanced collection over N.
Theorem 4.3. Let 〈N, v 〉 be a TU game that has a singleton pre-kernel such that {x} = PrK(v) ⊂ [~γ],
and let 〈N, vµ 〉 be a related game of v derived from x, then x = ν(N, v µ), whereas the payoff equivalence
class [~γ] has non-empty interior.
Proof. By our hypothesis, x = ν(N, v) is an interior point of an inscribed ellipsoid with maximum
volume ε := {y′ |hvγ(y′) ≤ c¯} ⊂ [~γ], whereas hvγ is of type (3.12) and c¯ > 0 (cf. Lemma 4.4). This
implies by Theorem 4.1 that this point is also a pre-kernel point of game vµ, there is no change in set
of lexicographically smallest most effective coalitions S(x) under vµ. The min-max excess value ψ∗
obtained by iteratively solving the LP (6.4-6.7) of Maschler et al. (1979, p. 332) for game v is smaller
than the maximum surpluses derived from S(x), this implies that there exists a ψ¯ ≥ ψ∗ s.t. S(x) ⊆
Dv(ψ¯,x), that is, it satisfies Property I of Kohlberg (1971). Moreover, matrix E⊤ induced from S(x)
has full rank, therefore, the column vectors of matrix E⊤ are a spanning system of Rn. Hence, we get
span {1S |S ∈ S(x)} = Rn, which implies that the corresponding matrix [1S ]S∈S(x) must have rank n,
therefore collection S(x) is balanced. In addition, we can choose the largest ψ ∈ R s.t. ∅ 6= Dv(ψ,x) ⊆
S(x) is valid, which is a balanced set. Furthermore, we have µ · v∆ ∈ [−C,C]p′ . Since C > 0, the set
Dv(ψ − 2C,x) 6= ∅ is balanced as well. Now observe that ev(S,x) − C ≤ ev(S,x) + µ · v∆(S) ≤
ev(S,x) + C for all S ⊆ N . This implies Dv(ψ,x) ⊆ S(x) ⊆ Dvµ(ψ − C,x) ⊆ Dv(ψ − 2C,x),
hence, Dvµ(ψ − C,x) is balanced. Let c ∈ [−C,C], and from the observation limc↑0 Dvµ(ψ + c,x) =
Dv
µ
(ψ,x) ⊇ Dv(ψ,x), we draw the conclusion x = ν(N, v µ).
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Theorem 4.4. Assume that the payoff equivalence class [~γ] induced from TU game 〈N, v 〉 has non-empty
interior. In addition, assume that game 〈N, v 〉 has a singleton pre-kernel such that {x} = PrK(v) ⊂ [~γ]
is satisfied, then the pre-kernel PrK(vµ) of a related TU game 〈N, vµ 〉, as defined by Lemma 4.3, consists
of a single point, which is given by {x} = PrK(vµ).
Proof. This result follows from Theorems 4.1, 4.3, and Propositions 4.2, 4.3.
Example 4.1. In order to illuminate the foregoing discussion of replicating a pre-kernel element consider
a four person average-convex but non-convex game that is specified by
v(N) = 16, v({1, 2, 3}) = v({1, 2, 4}) = v({1, 3, 4}) = 8,
v({1, 3}) = 4, v({1, 4}) = 1, v({1, 2}) = 16/3, v(S) = 0 otherwise,
with N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. The pre-kernel coalesces with the pre-nucleolus, which is given by the point:
ν(v) = PrK(v) = (44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9). Obviously, the set S(ν(v)) = {{2}, {3}, {4}, {1, 2}, {1, 3, 4}}
is balanced, form this set a boundary vector ~b = (4, 32/9, 32/9, 80/9, 12) is obtained by ν(v)(S) for
S ∈ S(ν(v)). Define matrix A by [1S ]S∈S(ν(v)), then the solution of the system Ax = ~b reproduces the
pre-nucleolus. Moreover, this imputation is even an interior point, thus the non-empty interior condition
is valid. Hence, by Theorem 4.1 a redistribution of the bargaining power among coalitions can be attained
while supporting the imputation (44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9) still as a pre-kernel element for a set of related
games. In order to get a null space NW with maximum dimension we set the parameter µ to 0.9. In this
case, the rank of matrix W must be equal to 4, and we could derive at most 11-linear independent games
which replicate the point (44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9) as a pre-kernel element. Theorem 4.4 even states that this
point is also the sole pre-kernel point, hence the pre-kernel coincide with the pre-nucleolus for these games
(see Table 4.1).
Notice that non of these 11-linear independent related games is average-convex. Only two games,
namely v1 and v3 are zero-monotonic and super-additive. Nevertheless, all games have a non-empty core
and are semi-convex. The cores of the games have between 16 and 24-vertices, and have volumes that
range from approximately 80 to 127 percent of the default core. TU game v2 has the smallest and v3 the
largest core.1 #
Table 4.1: List of Gamesd which possess the same unique Pre-Kernela as v
µ = 0.9
Game {1} {2} {1, 2} {3} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3} {4}
v 0 0 16/3 0 4 0 8 0
v1 18/49 32/95 127/24 -1/24 256/59 4/13 175/22 -1/24
v2 -9/25 21/38 89/16 11/48 231/58 42/71 385/47 11/48
v3 -14/45 -1/40 201/41 -28/65 39/11 -19/44 142/19 -28/65
v4 0 0 16/3 0 159/47 16/33 107/14 0
v5 0 0 16/3 0 149/40 -37/102 497/66 0
v6 0 0 16/3 0 4 -5/47 143/19 0
v7 0 0 16/3 0 4 -5/47 143/19 0
v8 0 0 16/3 0 149/40 -37/102 497/66 0
v9 0 0 16/3 0 149/40 -37/102 497/66 0
v10 0 0 16/3 0 4 -5/47 143/19 0
v11 0 0 16/3 0 4 -5/47 143/19 0
Continued on next page
1The example can be reproduced while using our MATLAB toolbox MatTuGames 2015b. The results can also be verified with
our Mathematica package TuGames 2015a.
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Table 4.1 – continued from previous page
µ = 0.9
Game {1, 4} {2, 4} {1, 2, 4} {3, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4} N ACV b ZM c
v 1 0 8 0 8 0 16 Y Y
v1 79/59 4/13 175/22 -4/57 792/95 10/33 16 N Y
v2 57/58 42/71 385/47 4/7 325/38 31/56 16 N N
v3 6/11 -19/44 142/19 -27/47 319/40 -29/55 16 N Y
v4 41/34 -3/46 428/53 7/34 8 14/25 16 N N
v5 203/120 2/41 167/19 -5/24 8 -9/19 16 N N
v6 1 23/29 139/16 0 8 18/31 16 N N
v7 1 -5/47 139/16 0 8 -8/25 16 N N
v8 19/24 2/41 71/9 83/120 8 26/61 16 N N
v9 19/24 2/41 71/9 -5/24 8 -9/19 16 N N
v10 1 -5/47 475/61 0 8 18/31 16 N N
v11 1 -5/47 475/61 0 8 -8/25 16 N N
a Pre-Kernel and Pre-Nucleolus: (44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9)
b ACV: Average-Convex Game
c ZM: Zero-Monotonic Game
d Note: Computation performed with MatTuGames.
5 ON THE CONTINUITY OF THE PRE-KERNEL
In the previous section, we have established uniqueness on the set of related games. Here, we generalize
these results while showing that even on the convex hull comprising the default and related games in the
game space, the pre-kernel must be unique and is identical with the point specified by the default game.
Furthermore, the pre-kernel correspondence restricted on this convex subset in the game space must be
single-valued, and therefore continuous.
Recall that the relevant game space is defined through G(N) := {v ∈ Gn | v(∅) = 0∧ v(N) > 0}, and
Gnµ,v :=
{
vµ ∈ G(N) |µ · v∆ ∈ [−C,C]p′
}
.
This set is the translate of a convex set by v, which is also convex and non-empty with dimension p′−m′,
if matrix W has rank m′ ≤ q < p′. Then we can construct a convex set in the game space G(N) by taking
the convex hull of game v and the convex set Gnµ,v, thus
Gnc := conv {v,Gnµ,v}.
Theorem 5.1. The pre-kernel PrK(vµ∗) of game vµ∗ belonging to Gnc is a singleton, and is equal to
{x} = PrK(v).
Proof. Let be {x} = PrK(v) for game v. Take a convex combination of games in Gnc , hence
vµ
∗
=
m∑
k=1
tk ·vµk +tm+1 ·v =
m∑
k=1
tk ·(v+µ ·v∆k )+tm+1 ·v = v+µ
m∑
k=1
tk ·v∆k +µ tm+1 ·0 = v+µ ·v∆
∗
,
with v∆∗ :=
∑m
k=1 tk · v∆k + tm+1 · 0, where 0 ≤ tk ≤ 1,∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m + 1}, and
∑m+1
k=1 tk = 1.
Then µ v∆∗ ∈ [−C,C]p′ , thus the set of lexicographically smallest coalitions S(x) does not change. By
Theorem 4.1 the vector {x} = PrK(v) is also a pre-kernel element of game vµ∗ . But then by Theorem 4.4
the pre-kernel of game vµ∗ consists of a single point, therefore {x} = PrK(vµ∗).
17
On the Single-Valuedness of the Pre-Kernel
Example 5.1. To see that even on the convex hull G4c , which is constituted by the default and related
games of Table 4.1, a particular TU game has the same singleton pre-kernel, we choose the following
vector of scalars ~t = (1, 3, 8, 1, 2, 4, 3, 5, 7, 9, 2, 3)/48 such that
∑12
k=1 tk = 1 is given to construct by
the convex combination of games presented by Table 4.1 a TU game vµ∗ that reproduces the imputation
(44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9) as its unique pre-kernel. The TU game vµ∗ on this convex hull in the game space
that replicates this pre-kernel is listed through Table 5.1:
Table 5.1: A TU Game vµ∗ on G4c with the same singleton Pre-Kernel as v a,b
S vµ
∗
(S) S vµ
∗
(S) S vµ
∗
(S) S vµ
∗
(S)
{1} −1/23 {1, 2} 134/25 {2, 4} 173/1125 {1, 3, 4} 576/71
{2} 8/71 {1, 3} 530/137 {3, 4} 19/144 {2, 3, 4} 15/232
{3} 2/75 {1, 4} 179/178 {1, 2, 3} 1436/187 N 16
{4} 2/75 {2, 3} −8/157 {1, 2, 4} 1946/239
a Pre-Kernel and Pre-Nucleolus: (44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9)
b Note: Computation performed with MatTuGames.
This game is neither average-convex nor zero-monotonic, however, it is again semi-convex and has a rather
large core with a core volume of 97 percent w.r.t. the core of the average-convex game, and 20 vertices in
contrast to 16 vertices respectively. #
Let X and Y be two metric spaces. A set-valued function or correspondence σ of X into Y is a rule that
assigns to every element x ∈ X a non-empty subset σ(x) ⊂ Y. Given a correspondence σ : X ։ Y, the
corresponding graph of σ is defined by
Gr(σ) := {(x, y) ∈ X× Y | y ∈ σ(x)} . (5.1)
Definition 5.1. A set-valued function σ : X։ Y is closed, if Gr(σ) is a closed subset of X× Y
The graph of the pre-kernel correspondence PrK is given by
Gr(PrK) :=
{
(v,x) | v ∈ Gn,x ∈ I0(v), sij(x, v) = sji(x, v) for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j
}
.
Similar, the graph of the solution set of function hv of type (3.3) is specified by
Gr(M(hv)) :=
{
(v,x) | v ∈ Gn,x ∈ I0(v), hv(x) = 0}
=
⋃
k∈J′
{
(v,x) | v ∈ Gn,x ∈ [~γk], hvγk(x) = 0
}
=
⋃
k∈J′
Gr(M(hvγk , [~γk])),
with J′ := {k ∈ J | g(~γk) = 0}. This graph is equal to the finite union of graphs of the restricted solution
sets of quadratic and convex functions hvγk of type (3.12). The restriction of each solution set of function
hvγk to [~γk] is bounded, closed, and convex (cf. Meinhardt (2013, Lemmata 7.1.3, 7.3.1)), hence each graph
Gr(M(hvγk , [~γk])) from the finite index set J
′ is bounded, closed and convex.
Proposition 5.1. The following relations are satisfied between the above graphs:
Gr(PrK) = Gr(M(hv)) =
⋃
k∈J′
Gr(M(hvγk , [~γk])). (5.2)
Hence, the pre-kernel correspondence PrK : G(N)։ Rn is closed and bounded.
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Proof. The equality of the graph of the pre-kernel and the solution set of function hv follows in accordance
with Corollary 3.1. Finally, the last equality is a consequence of Theorem 7.3.1 by Meinhardt (2013). From
this argument boundedness and closedness follows.
Definition 5.2. The correspondence σ : X։ Y is said to be upper hemi-continuous (uhc) at x if for every
open set O containing σ(x) ⊆ O it exists an open set Q ⊆ Y of x such that σ(x′) ⊆ O for every x′ ∈ Q.
The correspondence σ is uhc, if it is uhc for each x ∈ X.
Definition 5.3. The correspondence σ : X։ Y is said to be lower hemi-continuous (lhc) at x if for every
open set O in Y with σ(x) ∩ O 6= ∅ it exists an open set Q ⊆ Y of x such that σ(x′) ∩ O 6= ∅ for every
x′ ∈ Q. The correspondence σ is lhc, if it is lhc for each x ∈ X.
Lemma 5.1. Let X be a non-empty and convex polyhedral subset of Rp˜, and Y ⊆ Rn˜. If σ : X ։ Y is a
bounded correspondence with a convex graph, then σ is lower hemi-continuous.
Proof. For a proof see Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2007, pp. 185-186).
Theorem 5.2. The pre-kernel correspondence PrK : G(N) ։ Rn is on Gnc upper hemi-continuous as
well as lower hemi-continuous, that is, continuous.
Proof. The non-empty set Gnc is a bounded polyhedral set, which is convex by construction. We draw from
Proposition 5.1 the conclusion that the graph of the pre-kernel correspondence is bounded and closed.
Form Theorem 5.1 it follows | J′ | = 1 on Gnc , this implies that the graph of the pre-kernel correspondence
is also convex on Gnc . The sufficient conditions of Lemma 5.1 are satisfied, hence PrK is lower hemi-
continuous on Gnc . It is known from Theorem 9.1.7. by Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2007) that PrK is upper
hemi-continuous on G(N). Hence, on the restricted set Gnc , the set-valued function PrK is upper and
lower hemi-continuous, and therefore continuous. Actual, it is a continuous function on Gnc in view of
| J′ | = 1.
Corollary 5.1. The pre-kernel correspondence PrK : G(N)։ Rn is on Gnc single-valued and constant.
Example 5.2. To observe that on the restricted set G4c the pre-kernel correspondence PrK : G(N) ։ Rn
is single-valued and continuous, we exemplarily select a line segment in G4c to establish that all games on
this segment have the same singleton pre-kernel. For this purpose, we resume Example 4.1 and 5.1. Then
we choose a vector of scalars ~tǫ := (1, 3, 8, 1, 2, 4 + ǫ, 3, 5, 7, 9, 2 − ǫ, 3)/48 with tǫk ≥ 0 for each k such
that
∑11
k=0 t
ǫ
k = 1 and ǫ ∈ [−2, 2]. Thus, we define the line segment in G4c through TU game vµ
∗ from
Example 5.1 by
G4,lc :=
{ 11∑
k=0
tǫk · vµk
vµk ∈ G4c , ǫ ∈ [−2, 2]
}
.
Therefore, for each game in the line segment G4,lc , we can write
vǫ :=
11∑
k=1
tǫk · vµk + tǫ0 · v =
11∑
k=1
tk · vµk + t0 · v +
ǫ
48
(vµ6 − vµ11) = vµ
∗
+
ǫ
48
(vµ6 − vµ11)
= v + µ · v∆∗ + ǫ µ
48
(v∆6 − v∆11).
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We extend the pre-kernel element x = (44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9) to a vector x in order to define the excess
vector under game v as e := v − x, and for game vǫ as e vǫ := vǫ − x, respectively. According to these
definitions, we get for ~ζvǫ = ~ξvǫ at x the following chain of equalities:
~ξv
ǫ
= V⊤ e v
ǫ
= V⊤
(
v − x+ µ · v∆∗ + ǫ µ
48
(v∆6 − v∆11)
)
= V⊤ (v − x) = V⊤ e = ~ξ = ~ζ = 0,
The last equality is satisfied, since x is the pre-kernel of game v. Recall that it holds µ v∆∗ , µ v∆6 , µ v∆11 ∈
[−C,C]15, whereas V⊤ v∆∗ = V⊤ v∆6 = V⊤ v∆11 = 0 is in force. Therefore, for each TU game vǫ ∈ G4,lc
we attain
PrK(vǫ) = (44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9).
The pre-kernel correspondence PrK is a single-valued and constant mapping on G4,lc . Hence its is contin-
uous on the restriction G4,lc , and due to Theorem 5.2 a fortiori on G4c . #
6 PRESERVING THE PRE-NUCLEOLUS PROPERTY
In this section we study some conditions under which a pre-nucleolus of a default game can preserve the
pre-nucleolus property in order to generalize the above results in the sense to identify related games with
an unique pre-kernel point even when the default game has not a single pre-kernel point. This question
can only be addressed with limitation, since we are not able to make it explicit while giving only sufficient
conditions under which the pre-kernel point must be at least disconnected, otherwise it must be a singleton.
However, a great deal of our investigation is devoted to work out explicit conditions under which the pre-
nucleolus of a default game will loose this property under a related game.
For the next result remember that a balanced collection B is called minimal balanced, if it does not
contain a proper balanced sub-collection.
Theorem 6.1. Let 〈N, v 〉 be a TU game that has a non unique pre-kernel such that x ∈ PrK(v), y = ν(v)
with x,y ∈ [~γ]v, and x 6= y is satisfied. In addition, let 〈N, vµ 〉 be a related game of v with µ 6= 0 derived
from x such that x ∈ PrK(vµ) ∩ [~γ]vµ , and y 6∈ [~γ]vµ holds. If the collection Sv(x) as well as its sub-
collections are not balanced,
1. then y 6∈ PrN(vµ).
2. Moreover, if in addition x = y 6∈ [~γ]vµ , then x 6∈ PrN(vµ).
Proof. The proof starts with the first assertion.
1. By our hypothesis, x is a pre-kernel element of game v and a related game vµ that is derived from x.
There is no change in set of lexicographically smallest most effective coalitions Sv(x) under vµ due
to x ∈ [~γ]vµ , hence Sv(x) = Svµ(x). Moreover, we have µ · v∆ ∈ Rp′ . Furthermore, it holds y =
ν(v) by our assumption. Choose a balanced collection B that contains Sv(x) such that B is minimal.
Then single out any ψ ∈ R such that the balanced set Dv(ψ,y) satisfies Sv(x) ⊆ B ⊆ Dv(ψ,y) 6=
∅. Now choose ǫ > 0 such that Dv(ψ,y) = Dv(ψ − 2 ǫ,y) is given. The set Dv(ψ − 2 ǫ,y) is
balanced as well. Observe that due to x ∈ [~γ]vµ we get µ · v∆(S) ≤ ǫ for all S ⊂ N . However, it
exists some coalitions S ∈ Sv(x) such that ev(S,y)−ǫ 6≤ ev(S,y)+µ·v∆(S) holds. Let c ∈ [−ǫ, ǫ],
now as limc↑0 D
vµ(ψ+ c,y) = Dv
µ
(ψ,y) we have Dvµ(ψ,y) ⊆ Dv(ψ,y). Furthermore, we draw
the conclusion that Sv(x) 6⊆ Dvµ(ψ,y) is given due to Sv(x) = Sv(y) 6= Svµ(y). Therefore, we
obtain Dvµ(ψ,y) ⊂ B ⊆ Dv(ψ − 2 ǫ,y). To see this, assume that Dvµ(ψ,y) is balanced, then
we get B ⊆ Dvµ(ψ,y), since B is minimal balanced. This implies Sv(x) ⊆ Dvµ(ψ,y). However,
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this contradicts Sv(x) 6⊆ Dvµ(ψ,y). We conclude that Dvµ(ψ,y) ⊂ B must hold, but then the set
Dv
µ
(ψ,y) can not be balanced. Hence, y 6∈ PrN(vµ).
2. Finally, if x = y, then x is the pre-nucleolus of game v, but it does not belong anymore to payoff
equivalence class [~γ] under vµ, that is, [~γ] has shrunk. Therefore, Sv(x) 6= Svµ(x). Define from the
set Sv(x) a minimal balanced collection B that contains Sv(x). In the next step, we can single out
any ψ ∈ R such that the balanced set Dv(ψ,x) satisfies Sv(x) ⊆ B ⊆ Dv(ψ,x) 6= ∅. In view of
x ∈ PrK(vµ), it must exist an ǫ > 0 within the maximum surpluses can be varied without effecting
the pre-kernel property of x even when x 6∈ [~γ]vµ , thus we have µ · v∆(S) ≤ ǫ for all S ⊂ N . This
implies that Dv(ψ,x) ⊆ Dv(ψ − 2 ǫ,x) is in force. The set Dv(ψ − 2 ǫ,x) is balanced as well.
However, it exists some coalitions S ∈ Sv(x) such that ev(S,x) − ǫ 6≤ ev(S,x) + µ · v∆(S) is
valid. Let c ∈ [−ǫ, ǫ], now as limc↑0 Dvµ(ψ + c,x) = Dvµ(ψ,x) we have Dvµ(ψ,x) ⊆ Dv(ψ,x).
Furthermore, we draw the conclusion that Sv(x) 6⊆ Dvµ(ψ,x) is given due to Sv(x) 6= Svµ(x).
Therefore, we obtain Dvµ(ψ,x) ⊂ B ⊆ Dv(ψ − 2 ǫ,x) by the same reasoning as under (1). Then
the set Dvµ(ψ,x) can not be balanced. Hence, x 6∈ PrN(vµ).
Theorem 6.2. Let 〈N, v 〉 be a TU game that has a non unique pre-kernel such that x ∈ PrK(v) ∩ [~γ],
{y} = PrN(v) ∩ [~γ1] is satisfied, and let 〈N, vµ 〉 be a related game of v with µ 6= 0 derived from x such
that x ∈ PrK(vµ) ∩ [~γ] holds. If ∆ ∈ NW\NW1 , then y 6∈ PrK(vµ) and a fortiori y 6∈ PrN(vµ).
Proof. From the payoff equivalence classes [~γ] and [~γ1] we derive the corresponding matrices W := V⊤U
and W1 := V⊤1 U, respectively. By assumption, it is ∆ ∈ NW\NW1 satisfied. From this argument, we
can express the vector of unbalanced excesses ~ξ vµ at y by
~ξ v
µ
= V⊤1 e
µ = V⊤1 (v
µ − y) = V⊤1 (v − y + µ · v∆) = ~ξ v + µ ·V⊤1 v∆ = µ ·V⊤1 v∆ 6= 0.
Observe that ~ξ v = V⊤1 (v − y) = 0, since vector y ∈ [~γ1] is a pre-kernel element of game v. However,
due to ∆ ∈ NW\NW1 , we obtain V⊤1 v∆ 6= 0, it follows that y 6∈ PrK(vµ). The conclusion follows that
y 6∈ PrN(vµ) must hold.
Theorem 6.3. Let 〈N, v 〉 be a TU game that has a non unique pre-kernel such that x ∈ PrK(v)\PrN(v)
and x ∈ [~γ]. If 〈N, vµ 〉 is a related game of v with µ 6= 0 derived from x such that x ∈ PrK(vµ) ∩ [~γ]
holds, then x 6∈ PrN(vµ).
Proof. According to our assumption x is not the pre-nucleolus of game v, this implies that there exists
some ψ ∈ R such that Dv(ψ,x) 6= ∅ is not balanced. Recall that the set of lexicographically smallest most
effective coalitions Sv(x) has not changed under vµ, since x is a pre-kernel element of game vµ which still
belongs to the payoff equivalence class [~γ]. Then exists a bound ǫ > 0 within the maximum surpluses can
be varied without effecting the pre-kernel property of x. Thus, we get Dv(ψ,x) = Dv(ψ − 2 ǫ,x) 6= ∅ is
satisfied. Then ev(S,x)− ǫ ≤ ev(S,x) + µ · v∆(S) ≤ ev(S,x) + ǫ for all S ⊆ N , therefore, this implies
Dv
µ
(ψ − ǫ,x) = Dv(ψ,x). The set Dvµ(ψ − ǫ,x) is not balanced, we conclude that x 6∈ PrN(vµ).
Theorem 6.4. Assume that the payoff equivalence class [~γ] induced from TU game 〈N, v 〉 has non-empty
interior. In addition, assume that the pre-kernel of game 〈N, v 〉 constitutes a line segment such that
x ∈ PrN(v) ∩ ∂[~γ], PrK(v) ∩ [~γ1], and x ∈ PrK(vµ) ∩ [~γ] is satisfied, then the pre-kernel PrK(vµ) of a
related TU game 〈N, vµ 〉 with µ 6= 0 derived from x is at least disconnected, otherwise unique.
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On the Single-Valuedness of the Pre-Kernel
Proof. In the fist step, we have simply to establish that for game vµ the pre-imputations lying on the part
of the line segment included in payoff equivalence class [~γ1] under game v will loose their pre-kernel
properties due to the change in the game parameter. In the second step, we have to show that the pre-
nucleolus x under game v is also the pre-nucleolus of the related game vµ.
1. First notice that the payoff equivalence class [~γ] has full dimension in accordance with its non-empty
interior condition. This implies that the vector x must be the sole pre-kernel element in [~γ] (cf. with
the proof of Theorem 7.8.1 in Meinhardt (2013)). By our hypothesis, it is even a boundary point
of the payoff equivalence class under game v. Moreover, it must hold [~γ] ≁ [~γ1], since the rank
of the induced matrix E⊤ is n, and that of E⊤1 is n − 1, therefore, we have E⊤1 6= E⊤X for all
X ∈ GL+(n).
In the next step, we select an arbitrary pre-kernel element from PrK(v)∩ [~γ1], say y. By hypothesis,
there exists a related game vµ of v such that x ∈ PrK(vµ) ∩ [~γ] holds, that is, there is no change
in matrix E and vector ~α implying hvµ(x) = hvµγ (x) = 0. This implies that for game vµ the
payoff equivalence class [~γ] has been enlarged in such a way that we can inscribe an ellipsoid
with maximum volume ε := {y′ |hvµγ (y′) ≤ c¯}, whereas hv
µ
γ is of type (3.12) and c¯ > 0 (cf.
Lemma 4.4.). It should be obvious that element x is an interior point of ε, since x = M(hvµγ ) ⊂
ε ⊂ [~γ]. We single out a boundary point x′ in ∂[~γ] under game vµ which was a pre-kernel element
under game v, and satisfying after the parameter change the following properties: x′ ∈ ∂[~γ] ∩ [~γ1]
with x′ = x + z, and z 6= 0. This is possible due to the fact that the equivalence class [~γ] has
been enlarged at the expense of equivalence class [~γ1], which has shrunk or shifted by the change in
the game parameter. Observe now that two cases may happen, that is, either x′ ∈ ε or x′ /∈ ε. In
the former case, we have hvµγ (x′) = hv
µ
(x′) = hv
µ
γ1 (x
′) = c¯ > 0, and in the latter case, we have
hv
µ
γ (x
′) = hv
µ
(x′) = hv
µ
γ1 (x
′) > c¯ > 0 = hv(x′) = hvγ1(x
′).
From hvµγ1 (x
′) > 0, and notice that the vector of unbalanced excesses at x′ is denoted as ~ξ vµ , we
derive the following relationship
hv
µ
γ1 (x
′) = ‖ ~ξ vµ ‖2 = ‖ ~ξ v + µ · V⊤1 v∆ ‖2 = ‖µ · V⊤1 v∆ ‖2 = µ2 · ‖V⊤1 v∆ ‖2 > 0,
with µ 6= 0. Thus, we have V⊤1 v∆ 6= 0, and therefore ∆ ∈ NW\NW1 . Observe that ~ξ v =
V
⊤
1 (v−x′) = 0, since vector x′ ∈ [~γ1] is a pre-kernel element of game v. Take the vector y ∈ [~γ1]
from above that was on the line segment as vector x′ under game v which constituted a part of the
pre-kernel of game v, we conclude that y 6∈ PrK(vµ) in accordance with V⊤1 v∆ 6= 0.
2. By our hypothesis, x is the pre-nucleolus of game v, and an interior point of equivalence class
[~γ] of the related game vµ. Using a similar argument as under (1) we can inscribe an ellipsoid with
maximum volume ε, whereas hvµγ is of type (3.12) and c¯ > 0. In view of the assumption that x is also
pre-kernel element of game vµ, we can draw the conclusion that the set of lexicographically smallest
most effective coalitions S(x) has not changed under vµ. But then, we have µ · v∆ ∈ [−C,C]p′ .
In addition, there exists a ψ¯ ≥ ψ∗ s.t. S(x) ⊆ Dv(ψ¯,x), that is, it satisfies Property I of Kohlberg
(1971). Moreover, matrix E⊤ induced from S(x) has full rank, therefore, the column vectors of
matrix E⊤ are a spanning system of Rn. Hence, we get span {1S |S ∈ S(x)} = Rn as well, which
implies that matrix [1S ]S∈S(x) has rank n, the collection S(x) must be balanced. In accordance with
vector x as the pre-nucleolus of game v, we can choose the largest ψ ∈ R s.t. ∅ 6= Dv(ψ,x) ⊆ S(x)
is valid, which is a balanced set. Since C > 0, the set Dv(ψ − 2C,x) 6= ∅ is balanced as well.
Now observe that ev(S,x) − C ≤ ev(S,x) + µ · v∆(S) ≤ ev(S,x) + C for all S ⊆ N . This
implies Dv(ψ,x) ⊆ S(x) ⊆ Dvµ(ψ − C,x) ⊆ Dv(ψ − 2C,x), hence, Dvµ(ψ − C,x) is balanced.
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To conclude, let c ∈ [−C,C], and from the observation limc↑0 Dvµ(ψ + c,x) = Dvµ(ψ,x) ⊇
Dv(ψ,x), we draw the implication x = ν(N, v µ).
Finally, recall that the vector x is also the unique minimizer of function hvµγ , which is an interior point
of payoff equivalence class [~γ], therefore the pre-kernel of the related game vµ can not be connected.
Otherwise the pre-kernel of the game consists of a single point.
Corollary 6.1. Let 〈N, v 〉 be a TU game that has a non single-valued pre-kernel such that x ∈ PrN(v)∩
∂[~γ] and let 〈N, vµ 〉 be a related game of v derived from x, whereas x ∈ int [~γ]vµ , then x = ν(N, v µ).
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have established that the set of related games derived from a default game with an unique
pre-kernel must also possess this pre-kernel element as its single pre-kernel point. Moreover, we have
shown that the pre-kernel correspondence in the game space restricted to the convex hull comprising the
default and related games is single-valued and constant, and therefore continuous. Although, we could
provide some sufficient conditions under which the pre-nucleolus of a default game – whereas the pre-
kernel constitutes a line segment – induces at least a disconnected pre-kernel for the set of related games, it
is, however, still an open question if it is possible to obtain from a game with a non-unique pre-kernel some
related games that have an unique pre-kernel. In this respect, the knowledge of more general conditions
that preserve the pre-nucleolus property is of particular interest.
Even though, we have not provided a new set of game classes with a sole pre-kernel element, we
nevertheless think that the presented approach is also very useful to bring forward our knowledge about
the classes of transferable utility games where the pre-kernel coalesces with the pre-nucleolus. To answer
this question, one need just to select boundary points of the convex cone of the class of convex games
to enlarge the convex cone within the game space to identify game classes that allow for a singleton pre-
kernel.
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